Florida Law Review
Volume 7

Issue 2

Article 2

June 1954

Picketing--A Legal Cinderella
Hugh Douglas Price

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hugh Douglas Price, Picketing--A Legal Cinderella, 7 Fla. L. Rev. 143 (1954).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol7/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Price: Picketing--A Legal Cinderella

DATE DOWNLOADED: Thu Sep 8 12:22:12 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Hugh Douglas Price, Picketing--a Legal Cinderella, 7 U. FLA. L. REV. 143 (1954).
ALWD 7th ed.
Hugh Douglas Price, Picketing--a Legal Cinderella, 7 U. Fla. L. Rev. 143 (1954).
APA 7th ed.
Price, H. (1954). Picketing--a legal cinderella. University of Florida Law Review,
7(2), 143-177.
Chicago 17th ed.
Hugh Douglas Price, "Picketing--a Legal Cinderella," University of Florida Law Review
7, no. 2 (Summer 1954): 143-177
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Hugh Douglas Price, "Picketing--a Legal Cinderella" (1954) 7:2 U Fla L Rev 143.
AGLC 4th ed.
Hugh Douglas Price, 'Picketing--a Legal Cinderella' (1954) 7(2) University of Florida
Law Review 143
MLA 9th ed.
Price, Hugh Douglas. "Picketing--a Legal Cinderella." University of Florida Law
Review, vol. 7, no. 2, Summer 1954, pp. 143-177. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Hugh Douglas Price, 'Picketing--a Legal Cinderella' (1954) 7 U Fla L Rev 143
Provided by:
University of Florida / Lawton Chiles Legal Information Center
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1954

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1954], Art. 2

PICKETING -A

LEGAL CINDERELLA

HUGH DOUGLAS PRICE*
PROLOGUE

The remarkable history of the Supreme Court's handling of
picketing cases since the turn of the century is a legal Cinderella tale
without parallel. It is a fascinating study of constitutional law, not
only in terms of legal doctrines but in its insights into the danger of
careless use of labels and generalities, the complications of a federal
system, and the role of public opinion in influencing the Supreme
Court. Since the concern of this article is primarily with the relation
of peaceful picketing to the free speech guaranty of the First Amendment, only a brief resume of the pre-1937 development can be given.,
The subsequent period, however, constitutes in itself a complete threeact drama of the rise and decline of picketing as "free speech."
The first reported instance of picketing in the United States occurred in 1827 in connection with a strike that resulted in indictment
of the offending tailors for conspiracy. 2 Although scattered occasions
of picketing continued to occur in the following decades, the use of
common law conspiracy doctrines in labor disputes declined rapidly,
particularly after the acceptance of labor unions as legal organizations.
The first reported decision considering equitable relief against labor
activity did not come until 1880.3 Following that event the area of
allowable labor "persuasion by lawful means" was rapidly nibbled
away by the rise of what came to be referred to as "government by
injunction." 4 By regarding business enterprises as endowed with
*B.A. 1952, M.A. 1953, University of Florida; Teaching Fellow in Department
of Government, Harvard University.
'For an excellent survey of this period see Tanenhaus, Picketing as a Tort: The
Development of the Law of Picketing from 1880 to 1940, 14 U. oF PrrT. L. REv.
170 (1953), and Picketing as Free Speech: Early Stages in the Growth of the New
Law of Picketing, id. at 397.
2Tanenhaus, Picketing as a Tort: The Development of the Law of Picketing
from 18S0 to 1940, 14 U. oF Prrr. L. REv. 170, 171 (1953).
3Johnston Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt, 60 How. Pr. 168 (N.Y. 1880), aff'd, 24
Hun 489 (N.Y. 1881).
4This phrase came into wide use with its adoption by the Democratic party in
the campaign of 1896; see Westin, The Supreme Court, the Populist Movement
and the Campaign of 1896, 15 J. PoLrrics 3 (1953).
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the same basic rights customarily associated with real property, 5
judges were able to handle picketing as a prima facie tort. Intentional
acts which damaged property rights, as did picketing, were actionable
at law and enjoinable in equity, unless legally privileged. Some
uniformity among the state and federal courts in allowing nominal
picketing, and nominal picketing only, was achieved by two Supreme
Court decisions handed down in 1921.7 Although the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 generally prohibited federal courts from issuing
injunctions against labor self-help activities except in cases of fraud
or violence, picketing continued to be treated under the law of
torts, with the burden of justification on the picketers.
AcT I: FROM RAGS To RIcHEs - THE SUPREME COURT AS
FAIRY GODMOTHER

In the topsy-turvy constitutional world of 1937 the Supreme Court
had occasion, in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union," to pass on
Wisconsin's "little Norris-LaGuardia Act," which contained an antiinjunction section making, as the Wisconsin court interpreted it, all
nonenjoinable labor conduct "lawful." The facts were simple: The
tile layers' union had picketed a small-time, nonunion tiling contractor by the name of Senn, who had refused to sign a union shop
agreement. Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for a five-man majority,
held that the Constitution did not prohibit a state from authorizing
peaceful picketing, but his opinion contained a dictum which hinted
5For an analysis of the tremendous shift in American thought concerning
property during the period from the end of the Civil War to the turn of the
century see McCLosKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN THE AcE OF ENTERPRISE (1951).
6

See Tanenhaus, Picketing as a Tort: The Development of the Law of Picketing

from 1880 to 1940, 14 U. OF Prrr. L. REv. 170, 197 (1953). In general, to be
privileged picketing had to be in conjunction with a strike by the employees
themselves, Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), or by exemployees, American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184 (1921), for a legitimate objective of self-interest. The latter did not include
violation of a "yellow-dog contract," Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245
U.S. 229 (1917).
7American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, supra note 6;
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). The latter case is now notable chiefly
for one of Justice Holmes' most eloquent dissents, id. at 342, one of Justice Brandeis'
most scholarly dissents, id. at 354, and one of Justice Pitney's most incisive dissents,
id. at 344.
8301 U.S. 468 (1937).
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at a whole new basis for the law of picketing: 9
"Clearly the means which the statute authorizes - picketing
and publicity - are not prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. Members of a union might, without special statutory
authorization by a State, make known the facts of a labor
dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution. The State may, in the exercise of its police power,
regulate the methods and means of publicity as well as the use
of public streets. If the end sought by the unions is not forbidden by the Federal Constitution the State may authorize
working men to seek to attain it by combining as pickets, just as
it permits capitalists and employers to combine in other ways
to attain their desired economic ends."
The precise intent of Mr. Justice Brandeis's opinion will probably
never be known. 10 Although the second sentence of the above quotation, taken alone, could mean that picketing is a constitutionally
protected part of free speech, it does not clearly specify that such is
the intent."1 Further, the opinion also added: "The statute provides
that the picketing must be peaceful; and that term as used implies
not only absence of violence, but absence of any unlawful act."1 2
Although speech could only be prohibited in case of a "clear and
present danger," this matter of lawfulness was emphasized: 3
91d. at 478.
10That Justice Brandeis did not mean that picketing was protected speech is
indicated by his earlier dissent in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, supra
note 6,at 488: "Because I have come to the conclusion that both the common law
of a State and a statute of the United States declare the right of industrial combatants to push their struggle to the limits of the justification of self-interest,
I do not wish to be understood as attaching any constitutional or moral sanction
to that right." Of even more importance is the fact that Brandeis joined in Roberts'
decision in Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 203 U.S. 323 (1938). The Court forbade
a federal court injunction against picketing under the very same Wisconsin law
considered in the Senn case. The lower court was restrained, however, on the
grounds that the picketing was authorized by the state statute and that the conditions set forth by the Norris-LaGuardia Act for issuance of a federal injunction
had not been met. There was no mention of any constitutional right to picket.
"Professor Charles 0. Gregory, e.g., denies that this was the intent; see LABOR
AND THE LAw 340 (1949).
12301 U.S. 468, 479 (1937).
13Id. at 480. The repeated reference to the absence of any unlawful aspect of
the picketing is interesting in view of the subsequent development of the "unlawful
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"The sole purpose of the picketing was to acquaint the public
with the facts, and, by gaining its support, to induce Senn to
unionize his shop. There was no effort to induce Senn to do
an unlawful thing."
The specific holding of the case, to which four justices dissented, 14
was merely that a state may authorize working men to picket so long
as they do nothing unlawful.
Three years later, in Thornhill v. Alabama,5 Mr. Justice Murphy
applied the Brandeis dictum, minus the test of unlawfulness, in
striking down a flat prohibition by state law of all picketing: "In the
circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that
area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution." 16
Arguing that "[flree discussion concerning the conditions in industry
and the causes of labor disputes" is "indispensable to the effective
and intelligent use of the processes of popular government," '17 he
went on to indicate that only clear danger of substantive evils could
justify abridgment of picketing. Cinderella-like, the conduct which
had been a common law crime a century earlier, a prima facie tort
from 1880 to 1937, and had only received constitutional acceptance
as a statutory privilege by a five-to-four decision in 1937, thus emerged
as a constitutional right and one of the fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state interference.' 8
objective" formula.
'141d. at 483.

15310 U.S. 88 (1940). Justice McReynolds, the sole survivor of the four-man
minority of the Senn case, dissented.
161d. at 102.

171d. at 103. The rationale was thus the need for the communication of ideas
so as to promote public benefit, not to make unions immune from regulation in
the labor-management struggle for economic advantage.
l8The Thornhill decision was not without some ancestry, as over 50 picketing
decisions had previously considered, in varying degrees, the free speech aspectnearly half of these had preceded the Senn decision; see Tanenhaus, Picketing as
Free Speech: Early Stages in the Growth of the New Law of Picketing, 14 U. OF

Prrr. L. Rav. 397 (1953). Commentator reaction to the complete reversal ranged
from the bitter satire of Gregory, LABOR AND THE LAW 345 (1949), to Dodd's
satisfaction at the irony involved, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARv.
L. REv. 513, 531 (1943). See also Jaffe, In Defense of the Supreme Court's Picketing
Doctrine, 41 MicH. L. REv. 1037 (1943); Teller, Picketingand Free Speech, 56 HArv.
L. Rav. 180 (1942).
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The Thornhill case, in overthrowing a body of law built up over
a period of sixty years, raised far more questions than it answered.
Mr. Justice Murphy's identification of peaceful picketing with protected free speech suggested that all regulation of picketing must
meet the "clear and present danger" test. Viewed narrowly, however,
the case only held a complete prohibition by prior restraint of all
picketing to be unconstitutional. This gave little indication of how
the Court might later react to various restrictions on the methods of
picketing or on the objectives sought in picketing. 9 Carlson v.
California,20 decided the same day, in striking down a comprehensive
county ordinance against display of banners by picketers provided
little additional light; however, Mr. Justice Murphy showed his apparent determination to apply free speech criteria by again relying
on the clear and present danger test.
The next year, in Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,2I the Court considered a state injunction
against picketing which was said to be so enmeshed with past violence
that it necessarily constituted coercion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
speaking for the majority, held that "utterance in a context of violence
can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of
an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered
by the Constitution." 22 Justices Reed, Black, and Douglas argued, in
dissent, that the state could take action against the unlawful violence
and thus prevent coercion without a blanket prohibition of further
23
picketing in the conflict.
19That these would prove to be crucial questions was obvious. "The 'end' of
labor activities and the 'means' by which they are pursued constitute the chief
inquiries of labor law," FRANKFURTER and GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNOTION 5

(1930).
U.S. 106 (1940). Reynolds, J., again dissented.
21312 U.S. 287 (1941).
22d. at 293.
23
See the dissent of Black, J., joined in by Douglas, J., id. at 299, and that
of Reed, J., id. at 317. An analogous limitation on the free speech of the employer
was, however, supported by Justice Murphy in NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power
Co., 314 U.S. 469, 478 (1941): "The mere fact that language merges into a course
of conduct does not put that whole course without the range of otherwise applicable administrative power." In line with this "totality of conduct" view Sec.
8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§141-197 (1952),
provides that written or graphic expression by the employer of his views
shall not constitute an unfair labor practice if "such expression contains no
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." Liberal critics of limitations
20310
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If Meadowmoor represented a retreat from the free speech approach, then American Federation of Labor v. Swing2' was a direct
undermining of that concept. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for the majority, denied that a state could forbid peaceful picketing merely bedispute, but his rationale
cause of the absence of an employer-employee
25
was not that of picketing-free speech:
"A state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of
economic competition between employers and workers so small
as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by
him. The interdependence of economic interest of all engaged
in the same industry has become a commonplace."
Then he approvingly quoted the Senn dictum of Mr. Justice Brandeis, which is a complete non sequitur to the idea of drawing any
kind of limited "circle of economic competition." Although Mr.
Justice Murphy went along with this opinion, Justices Black and
Douglas concurred only in the result.
In the 1942 session of the Court the implicit divergence of doctrine
suggested in the Swing decision became explicit in Carpenters &
Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe,26 which resulted in a split decision

marked by sharply worded dissents. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote
the decision for the five-man majority, upholding a Texas court injunction restraining picketing of Ritter's cafe by building trades
union members. Ritter was having a contractor who used nonunion
labor build a home for him at a location some one-half mile from
the cafe. Dropping the conciliatory ambiguity of his Swing case
decision, Justice Frankfurter referred to picketing not so much as
free speech but as an industrial weapon. Although conceding that
on union picketing generally overlook limitations such as this and the controversial "captive audience" rule, which restrict employer free speech; see Note,
Limitations upon an Employer's Right of Noncoercive Free Speech, 38 VA. L. REV.
1037 (1952); 6 U. OF FLA. L. Rav. 127 (1953).
24312 U.S. 321 (1941). Two intervening cases of less importance were United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) (upholding picketing in jurisdictional
disputes as not being in conflict with the Sherman Act), and Milk Wagon Drivers
Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940) (denying power of
a federal court to issue a labor injunction except as authorized under the NorrisLaGuardia Act).
25312 U.S. 321, 326 (1941)
26315 U.S. 722 (1942).
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it "may be a phase of the constitutional right of free utterance," he
added that this "does not imply that the states must be without power
to confine the sphere of communication to that directly related to
the dispute." 27 Seeing no nexus between the cafe as a business and
the building dispute, Justice Frankfurter stated that the state need
not allow the picketers "to conscript neutrals having no relation to
28
either the dispute or the industry in which it arose."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's limiting of picketing-free speech to the
area of economic nexus brought forth a dissent from Mr. Justice
29
Black, which was concurred in by Justices Douglas and Murphy.
Honors for the day, however, went to Mr. Justice Reed, whose dissent
indicated the reason for considering picketing as a part of speech, 30
31
the extent to which a state could regulate the method of picketing,
32
and then summarized and demolished the Frankfurter position:
"By this decision a state rule is upheld which forbids peaceful
picketing of businesses by strangers to the business and the
industry of which it is a part. The legal kernel of the Court's
present decision is that the 'sphere' of free speech is confined
to the 'area of the industry within which a labor dispute arises.'
"We are not told whether the test of eligibility to picket is to
be applied by crafts or enterprises, or how we are to determine
economic interdependence or the boundaries of particular
industries."
The implicit prediction of Mr. Justice Reed's conclusion that "until
today, orderly, regulated picketing has been within the protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment" 33 was later borne out by lower court
271d. at 727.

28d. at 728.
29d. at 729.
-Old. at 738: "In balancing social advantages it has been felt that the preservation of free speech in labor disputes was more important than the freedom
of enterprise from the burdens of the picket line."
3llbid.: "We do not doubt the right of the state to impose not only some but
many restrictions upon peaceful picketing. Reasonable numbers, quietness,
truthful placards, open ingress and egress, suitable hours or other proper limitations, not destructive of the right to tell of labor difficulties, may be required."
321d. at 789.
531d. at 788.
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interpretations of the decision.3 4
The Court's concern with the question of who can picket whom,
rather than with the problem of the objectives for which any picketing
can be carried on, was further evidenced in Bakery & Pastry Drivers
& Helpers Local v. Wohl.3 5 The New York courts had enjoined
picketing of a bakery which sold goods to nonunion route drivers
who owned their own trucks, on the ground that, since the drivers
were sole owners of their enterprises, no genuine labor dispute existed.
Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the majority, held that "one need
not be in a 'labor dispute' as defined by state law to have a right under
the Fourteenth Amendment to express a grievance in a labor matter"3 6
and went on to deny existence of a "substantive evil of such magnitude
...
37
as to mark a limit to the right of free speech.
Although the decision of the Wohl case thus appeared superficially to be within the Thornhill tradition, the grounds of the
decision proved to be the roots of a very different trend. Mr. Justice
Jackson stated that there was no evidence of violence, force, or coercion, "or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppressive . ..or abuse
of the right to free speech through the use of excessive picketing." 3
His further statement that a "state is not required to tolerate in all
places and all circumstances even peaceful picketing by an individual,"39 without making reference to the clear and present danger
test, forced Justices Douglas, Black, and Murphy into a separate concurrence. The concurring opinion, written by Mr. Justice Douglas,
objected: "If the opinion in this case means that a State can prohibit
picketing when it is effective but may not prohibit it when it is ineffective, then I think we have made a basic departure from Thornhill
v. Alabama. .. ."40 Then Mr. Justice Douglas added an observation
which points out the line for much of the Court's later attitude toward
peaceful picketing: 41
3

4See, e.g., the conclusion of the federal district judge in Stapleton v. Mitchell,
60 F. Supp. 51, 59 (D. Kans. 1945): ".... the 'dear and present danger test' as applied to peaceful picketing in the Thornhill case gave way to the 'reasonable basis'

test in the Ritter case."
385315 U.S. 769 (1942).
361d. at 774.

37rd. at 775.
38Ibid.
39Ibid.

40 bid.
411d. at 776. From this has evolved the concept that picketing is a hybrid; see
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"Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech,
since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the
very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind
or another quite irrespective of the ideas which are being
disseminated."
The Second World War and accompanying full employment
and relative labor peace gave the Court something of a respite as far
as picketing cases were concerned. In 1943, however, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter did have occasion in Cafeteria Employees Union v.
Angelos 42 to restate his views on picketing. The Court unanimously
upheld the right of peaceful picketing of self-operated cafeterias, but
the basis of unanimity appeared to be the inherent inconsistency
of Frankfurter's opinion more than anything else. After stating that
the Senn dictum, as applied in later cases, had enforced "the right of
workers to state their case and to appeal for public support in an
orderly and peaceful manner regardless of the area of immunity as
defined by state policy," 43 he quoted with approval his Swing case
rationale that a state cannot exclude picketing by drawing the circle
of economic competition so small as to contain only the employer and
his employees. How these two views could be compatible, or how
the former could be reconciled with his opinion in Ritter's Cafe 4Justice Frankfurter did not make clear.
As the end of the war approached public opinion moved toward
a more and more critical attitude in regard to organized labor.45 New
18 (1950).
42520 U.S. 293 (1943). The facts involved a combination of the Swing case

FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT

circumstances of picketing by nonemployees, plus those of the Wohl case, in which
there was technically no labor dispute.
431d. at 295.
44Justice Frankfurter emphatically denied that the state was powerless to con-

fine the area of strife or without a right to impose restrictions; see p. 6 supra.
45The old pattern of a period of government intervention in a negative fashion
to eliminate objectionable practices, then actual promotion and assistance for
the particular interest in question, and finally positive regulation in the public
interest, was repeated. For organized labor the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932
marks the first stage; the Wagner Act of 1935 marks the second; the Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947 marks the third. When viewed in perspective New Deal assistance
to labor does not seem so great as many commentators indicate. The period of
actual promotion of unions lasted barely a decade and was largely limited to
favorable legal conditions for self-development, such as had already been achieved

in most other industrialized countries. In contrast, business and industry re-
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restrictive legislation was passed in many states, 48 and by 1947 Congress
was debating the violently anti-labor Hartley Bill, in comparison to
which the ultimately adopted Taft-Hartley Act was so much milder
as to be almost pro-labor.4 7 The new laws defining many unfair labor
practices seemed certain to force the Court to consider the status of
picketing in relation to the unlawful acts or objectives which Mr.
Justice Brandeis had mentioned in the Senn case and which Mr.
Justice Jackson had hinted at in his Wohl opinion. Would the Thornhill rationale of picketing as protected free speech be relegated to
the shelf as a historical oddity, or would the Court attempt to implement its logic by modifying the dear and present danger test
so as to be applicable to picketing regulation?
AcT II: A

STRANGER IN PARADISE-

THE "UNLAWFUL OBJECTIVE"

RULE AS VILLAIN

In 1949 the leading case of Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice

Co. 48 came to the Court. The specific facts involved picketing to

prevent a distributor from selling ice to nonunion peddlers. This
union action attempted to force the employer into a violation of the
state anti-trade restraint law rather than of a state labor relations
act or "right to work" law, but the principle was the same: picketing
to force violation of a valid state law. In a carefully worded decision
which gained the unanimous support of the Court, Mr. Justice Black
pointed out that the picketing was part of "a single and integrated
ceived favorable legal status plus government subsidies and protective tariffs for
a period of approximately a century. Labor has never received anything to compare with the Hamiltonian program backed by the Federalists, or the Whig
"American Plan" popularized by Henry Clay, or the multimillion-acre public land
grants for railroad promotion after the Civil War, or the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act
of 1930, or the current billions in subsidies for agriculture. For example, in 1816
Congress established a tariff to protect domestic capital against foreign competition;
it was 105 years later, in 1921, before labor was able to get Congress to enact an
immigration quota system to protect domestic labor. An excellent summary of the
development of federal aid and its regulation is contained in FAINSOD and GORDON,
GOvERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY cc. 2-7 (rev. ed. 1948).

46See Dodd, Some State Legislatures Go to
REv. 148 (1944).

War-on Labor Unions, 29

IowA L.

47The basic difference was that the Hartley Bill, H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1947), aimed to outlaw all labor activities not specifically sanctioned, while
the finally adopted Taft-Hartley Act relies on enumerating a specific list of unfair
labor practices.
48336 U.S. 490 (1949).
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course of conduct,"' ' 9 aimed at violation of an important public law,
such violation constituting a felony. Regarding the struggle as one
between the union and the state to determine what policies should
be paramount in regulating state trade practices, he concluded: "It
rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech
and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral
part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute. We reject
5 o
the contention now."
Although this decision seemed to open the Pandora's box of "unlawful objectives," Mr. Justice Black's opinion indicated specific
limits for its application. First, the picketing must be part of an
"integrated" course of action. Second, the law involved must prohibit
injury to the public. Third, the offense must be against an "important public law," not merely aimed at "slight inconveniences or
annoyances." Finally, there must be "dear danger, imminent and
immediate" of violating the law. As a modification of the clear and
present danger test of a substantive evil these criteria seemed promising,
but they were destined to be ignored by a majority of the Court in
subsequent picketing cases.
In 1950, the tenth anniversary of the Thornhill decision, the
Court marked the occasion by stating in Hughes v. Superior Court
of California:51
"It has been amply recognized that picketing, not being the
equivalent of speech as a matter of fact, is not its inevitable
legal equivalent. Picketing is not beyond the control of a
State if the manner in which picketing is conducted or the
purpose which it seeks to effectuate gives ground for its disallowance."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter then proceeded to uphold for the majority
491d. at 498.

50bid.
1339 U.S. 460 (1951). Frankfurter here speaks for the majority. For the impact
of this and other post-Thornhill cases on the status of picketing see Burstein,
Picketing and Speech, 4 LABOR L.J. 791 (1953); Howard, The Unlawful Purpose
Doctrine in Peaceful Picketing and Its Application in the California Cases, 24 So.
CArF. L. REv. 145 (1951); Sukloff, A Decade of Picketing as an Exercise of Free
Speech, 2 SYRAcUSE L. Rlv. 101 (1950); Tanenhaus, Picketing-Free Speech: The
Growth of the New Law of Picketing from 1940 to 1952, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1952);
Weinberg, Thornhill to Hanke- The Picketing Puzzle, 20 U. oF CIN. L. REv. 437
(1951).
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of the Court an injunction against the picketing by a Negro civic
group of a California store which, in accordance with judicially announced state policy against discrimination, refused to hire Negro
employees on a specific proportional basis. With Mr. Justice Douglas
absent, Justices Black and Minton concurred in the decision on the
basis of the Giboney ruling, and Mr. Justice Reed concurred that
picketing to achieve discrimination was, under the Giboney rationale,
unlawful.52 Judicially announced state policies thus were raised to
an equal status with Mr. Justice Black's carefully stated and narrowly limited area of legislative discretion to set unlawful objectives,
for whose pursuit picketing could be enjoined.
On the same day, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Hanke, 3 Mr. Justice Frankfurter further extended the unlawful objective concept to uphold an injunction against peaceful picketing
not in violation of either state law or established state judicial policy.
The state court had decided that the objective of the picketing was
contrary to the best interests of the people of the community and hence
enjoinable. In his opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter emphasized that
"picketing is 'indeed a hybrid.'" The effort of the Court, he continued, was to "strike a balance between the constitutional protection
of the element of communication in picketing and 'the power of the
State to set the limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants.' ,54 In an effort to reconcile this with the Court's previous record he indicated that the Senn case turned solely on the Wisconsin
statutory authorization rather than on a Fourteenth Amendment
right,55 and summarized the import of the Swing, Wohl, and Angelos
cases as follows: "In those cases we held only that a State could not
proscribe picketing merely by setting artificial bounds, unreal in
the light of modern circumstances, to what constitutes an industrial
relationship or a labor dispute." 56 Mr. Justice Clark concurred in
5ZThe California court had suggested that picketing against employment
discrimination rather than for it would be allowable. This distinction is a striking
parallel to the commerce clause cases holding a law requiring discrimination to
be an interference with interstate commerce, Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373
(1946), while a law forbidding discrimination is acceptable, Bob-Lo Excursion
Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
.STogether with Automobile Drivers & Demonstrators Local v. Cline, 339 U.S.

470 (1950).
541d. at 474.
551d. at 476.
56Id. at 479.
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the result, while Justices Black, Minton, and Reed dissented, 57 as
Mr. Justice Douglas would probably have done had he been present.
As an anti-climax Mr. Justice Minton assumed the opinion-writing
chore in Building Service Employees InternationalUnion v. Gazzam.58
Union picketing had been carried on for a purpose in violation of
a state law, but the circumstances could be distinguished from the
Giboney situation, since the law involved carried no criminal sanction.59 The decision, holding that "adequate basis for the instant
decree is the unlawful objective of the picketing," 60 proclaimed that
it is not the presence or absence of a criminal sanction which makes
a state policy "important public law."' 1 Despite this nod in the
direction of his Giboney opinion, Mr. Justice Black concurred separately.
Thus in one year's time the rationale of clear and immediate
danger of violating an important public law aimed at no slight inconveniences, as put forth in the Giboney case, was stretched to
include violation of a public law that carries no criminal sanction
at all, 6 2 violation of established state judicial policies, 63 and violation
of policy deemed by a state court to be in the best interests of the
community in a particular instance.6 4 Where would the Court call
a halt?
In 1951 the attention of the Court was shifted from state regulation of labor practices to the Taft-Hartley Act. In NLRB v. Denver
Building and Construction Trades Council,65 the second of four
decisions" handed down the same day, all turning on the problem
071d. at 481.

Minton and Reed, JJ., took strong exception to this strange

interpretation.

5s339 U.S. 532 (1950).
"9Violation of the anti-trade restraint act in the Giboney case carried a maximum
penalty of $5,000 fine and up to 5 years' imprisonment and also laid the defendant
open to suit for treble damages.
60339 U.S. 532, 539 (1950).
6lThe Giboney criterion of an "important public law," however, was not just
the criminal sanction involved but that it was aimed at no slight inconvenience or

annoyances.
O2The Gazzam case extension.
O3The Hughes case extension.
04The Hanke and Cline extension.
605341 U.S. 675 (1951). Jackson, Douglas, and Reed, JJ., dissented, id. at 692.
G6The first, NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951), turned
on statutory construction of "concerted activity." Although picketing was involved,
the constitutional issue of free speech was not considered.
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of the Taft-Hartley Act's "unfair labor practices" as unlawful objectives, the Court upheld the prohibition of picketing as "a mere
signal by a labor organization to its members, or to the members of
its affiliates, to engage in an unfair labor practice .... ."'I In the third
8
case, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, Q
in which the Court admitted that "there is no finding here that the
picketing and other activities of petitioners were mere signals in
starting.and stopping a strike," it nevertheless upheld the injunction,
since "an objective of the picketing, although not necessarily the only
objective of the picketing," was to achieve an unlawful objective.
Justices Douglas, Reed, and Jackson dissented in both cases.
The import of these decisions seemed disastrous to the picketingfree speech doctrine, and legal commentators were quick to read the
death rites over the Thornhill rule:
"Although the Court [in the Hanke case] did not specifically
overrule the Thornhill case, it effectively repudiated its assimilation of picketing to speech, with the result that with
other decisions the Thornhill doctrine has become an aberration in constitutional law as it was originally an aberration
from reality."6 9
"In spite of the Supreme Court's previous decisions discouraging such evasions, the trend now seems to be in the direction
of creating a northwest passage around the Thornhill doctrine.
This takes the course of concluding that it was never intended
to protect 'illegal' picketing. And 'illegality' in this new trend
will apparently be what legislatures and judges agree that it
should be."70
"By this time [1952] the United States Supreme Court had given
up its power to control state regulation of picketing under
7
the doctrine which characterized picketing as speech." '
67341 U.S. 675, 690 (1951).
r8341 U.S. 694, 700 (1951). The fourth case, Local 74, Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 241 U.S. 707, also decided the same day, turned on disposition of a dispute which had begun before passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.
69Harris, Constitutional Law in 1949-1950, 45 AmER. POL. SCIENCE REv. 86, 100

(1951).
70GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw

461 (1949).

7'Divine, Constitutionality of Economic Regulations, 2 J.
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To those of a liberal inclination the outlook appeared dark:72
"Now it looks as though state courts, by the simple device
of declaring union objectives contrary to public policy, can
ban peaceful picketing in almost all situations where there is
room for difference of opinion as to these objectives. We seem
to be on the road back to government by injunction."
Is such pessimism necessary? Has the unlawful objective formula
really been the stroke of midnight for picketing as a modem legal
Cinderella? Has the marvelous vehicle of constitutional protection
turned into the pumpkin of prohibition for any objective which can
be made unlawful on a reasonable basis? Is our modem legal drama
to end as a tragedy before the appearance of a Prince Charming?
Before hazarding a prediction as to what Act III promises to be like
it may be wise to recapitulate and analyze the various approaches suggested for use in handling peaceful picketing cases.
Remarkably, one of the most nearly accurate statements of the
status of picketing down to the present can be found in an article
73
written over ten years ago:

"The recently established constitutional right of peaceful
picketing is a limited right -limited by the extent to which
picketing is interwoven with acts of violence, by the place in
which the picketing is carried on, by the relation between the
person picketed and the persons directly involved in the dispute,
and, presumably, by the lawfulness of the objective in aid of
which the picketing is carried on."
Today only the word "presumably" need be omitted -the unlawful
objective formula is now well established and has been supported
to varying degrees by every member of the present Court except the
recently appointed Chief Justice, who has not yet had occasion to
consider

it.7

4

But, to remain even as a limited right, there must be

a limit on the extent to which the right can be limited. And here
we reach the crux of our problem. Which of the various suggested
72Fraenkel, Peaceful Picketing- Constitutionally Protected?, 99 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 1, 12 (1950).
73Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HAv. L. Rav. 513, 529 (1943).
74For a comparison of the views of the individual justices on "unlawful objective" criteria see appendix.
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constitutional criteria can best accommodate necessary limits on
peaceful picketing in a manner consistent with traditional American
democratic thought? Which does it appear most likely that the Court
will apply in the future?
The pre-Thornhill attitude, which regarded picketing purely as
economic coercion constituting a tort unless specially privileged,
totally disregarded the undeniable element of communication in
most picketing. A complete prohibition by prior restraint of all
picketing by any methods and for any objectives is certainly hard
to reconcile with the American tradition of maximum freedom of
speech and press. Before the Thornhill case, however, there existed
no clear restraint on the power of the states or of Congress to do so.
And even in the absence of any restrictive legislation the burden
of proof for justifying picketing lay on the picketers.
The Thornhill doctrine went to the other extreme. In identifying
all peaceful picketing with protected free speech the Court ignored
the very real differences between ordinary speech and picketing by an
organized group. First, and least important, the factual information
conveyed by means of picketing is very small in comparison to most
conventional media7 5 Second, picketing differs from most conventional media in having, to a large degree, a captive
audience.7 6 Third, and most important, picketing per se, especially
by an organized group, is indeed more than speech-it is truly a
hybrid, the coercive elements of which may range from a minor
psychological barrier to very drastic economic sanctions. 77 To a
considerable extent acceptance of the complete identification of
75In rebuttal it can validly be asked whether an "Employer is Unfair" sign
conveys appreciably less information than an "I like Ike" sign or one proclaiming
that "I'd Walk a Mile for a Camel." This argument appears especially weak in
view of the Court's attitude toward an attempt to use picketing to convey information on a public issue; see note 113 infra.
76Billboards and loudspeakers are two other "speech" media that raise special
problems because of their power to command unwilling audiences. There has
been much more discussion of the right to speech than of the right to privacy
for those who prefer it to being bombarded on every side by irritating advertising
and other appeals.
7
7 In the Giboney case, e.g., the mere initiation of picketing resulted in an
85% decrease in the distributor's business, since 85% of the drivers were union
members who would be subject to fine or suspension for crossing the picket line.
Such intra-union coercion can hardly be classified as peaceful persuasion by free
speechl See Armstrong, Where Are We Going with Picketing? Intra-Union
Coercion Is Not Free Speech, 36 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1948).
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picketing with free speech would have been to invoke constitutional
dogma to enforce economic laissez faire, not on an individualistic
basis but for a pluralistic order of groups competing in largely unregulated economic warfare. It is a bit hypocritical for liberals,
who have bitterly criticized the "old" Court for using the magic
wand of "freedom of contract" to immunize the activities of corporations from government regulation, to demand that the current
Court touch the magic wand of "freedom of speech" to every species
of peaceful picketing by unions regardless of objective, economic
consequence, or effect on the public welfare.
Even before Thornhill the fact that bans on picketing may raise
questions under the First Amendment had been pointed out in over
fifty decisions.78 In retrospect it appears that Mr. Justice Murphy
would have been wiser had he somewhat restrained his laudable
enthusiasm for civil liberties and, in the traditional manner of constitutional law, ruled only on the issue before the Court, namely,
whether a total ban on all picketing violates the First Amendment.
The future law of picketing could then have been built up on a case
by case basis. It now appears that the attempt to pull all peaceful
picketing within the full protection of the free speech guaranty has
brought a reaction which threatens to "throw the baby out with the
wash."70
In logical terms, once it is admitted that picketing is more than
conventional speech, there can be only two general approaches. If
picketing cannot be divorced from the elements which make it more
than speech, then it must be regarded as entitled to only a degree of
protection less than that afforded speech. This approach, accepting
the hybrid nature of picketing as inherent, would make it a limited
right.80 This would be done by use of a test not so strict as that of
a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, but still requiring
more than a mere reasonable basis for a policy before picketing, for
78See note 18 supra. A complete identification of peaceful picketing with protected speech would, of course, still leave the Court with the difficult task of
determining criteria to apply in implementing the "clear and present danger"
rubric. For analysis of the considerations involved and some of the more recent
developments see, respectively, McCloskey, Free Speech, Sedition, and the Constitution, 45 AiruR. POL. SCIENCE REy. 662 (1951), and Kittleson and Smith, Free
Speech (1949-1952): Slogans v. States' Rights, 5 U. or FLA. L. REV. 227 (1952).
70Constitutionally, this would be the result of an unqualified acceptance of

the unlawful objective formula.
S0See p. 15 supra.
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an objective contrary to that policy, would be enjoined. Mr. Justice
Black used this approach in his Giboney opinion, but the majority
of the Court have failed to follow it in subsequent cases.81
The second alternative, again conceding that picketing is more
than speech, is to attempt to split off those instances of picketing that
involve more than speech. Thus the remaining area would be entitled
to full constitutional protection on the same terms as ordinary speech,
while the "more than speech" cases could be relegated to "reasonable
basis" regulation with no fear of loss of basic civil liberties. In logic
this appears irrefutable, but in fact can picketing be so divided?
Does Mr. Justice Frankfurter's economic nexus doctrine meet
the test? This theory removes an area of picketing, namely, all beyond the labor dispute or industry involved, from protection and
leaves only the area within this magic circle to be regarded as constitutionally protected. It requires no elaboration to show that this
is a superficial distinction bearing no necessary relationship to the
degree of nonspeech coercion involved. Cases already decided by the
Court have involved extreme economic coercion within the immediate
area of a labor dispute; and, conversely, there are many instances
in which picketing purely for publicity is carried on entirely beyond
the limits of an industry or in the absence of a labor dispute. Perhaps the surest indication of the uselessness of this concept as a constitutional criterion is that it functions only for labor disputes. Picketing, although peculiarly suited as a weapon of labor, has been
carried on by consumer groups, by religious factions, by patriotic
organizations, by suffragettes, by draftees' mothers, by left-wing
sympathizers, and by many others in circumstances often having absolutely nothing to do with economic warfare or labor disputes.82
A more serious attempt to separate picketing-free speech from
picketing-coercion has been advanced83 that appears similar to the
current position of Mr. Justice Douglas. This is the "signal-publicity"
dichotomy. Briefly, it holds that picketing for the purpose of peaceful
persuasion of the public through publicity is entitled to all the constitutional protection of free speech; picketing as a signal for economic
coercion, however, is beyond the pale and presumably subject to
siSee appendix.
S2The existence of picketing for purposes other than those involved in labor
disputes also highlights the unreality of the pre-Thornhill tort theory of picketing.
83Cox, The Influence of Mr. Justice Murphy on Labor Law, 48 MIcH. L. Ra.
767 (1950), and Strikes, Picketing, and the Constitution, 4 VA.W. L. Rav. 574 (1951).
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regulation on any reasonable basis. The implicit assumption of this
approach is not just that the "more than speech" aspects of picketing
can be divorced, but that there are basically two separate kinds of
picketing. Presumably the two may overlap somewhat, but the Court
is still assumed able to draw the line between the two.
The difficulty of finding a dividing line is well illustrated by Mr.
Justice Douglas's dissent in Local Union No. 10, United Ass'n of
Journeyman Plumbers & Steamfitters v. Graham. 4 The majority
had upheld an injunction against picketing when at least one of
the objectives was in violation of a state right-to-work law. After
attempting to distinguish lawful and unlawful purposes Mr. Justice
Douglas stated: "No court would be entitled to prevent the dissemination of the news 'This is not a Union Job,' whether it be by
radio, by newspaper, by pamphlets, or by picketing."8 5 He then
effectively contradicted himself, with apologies, as follows: 6
"The line between permissible and unlawful picketing
will therefore often be narrow or even tenuous. A purpose to
deprive nonunion men of employment would make the picketing unlawful; a purpose to keep union men away from the job
would give the picketing constitutional protection."
In practice the latter statement rests upon a false antithesis, since
by keeping union men away pressure is exerted on the employer to
deprive nonunion men of jobs. Yet this very purpose, which would
make the picketing unlawful, can be accomplished by the mere
dissemination of news, which Justice Douglas says no court would be
entitled to prevent. He finally lamented the lack of definitive findings
as to the specific purpose of the picketing. Was it a signal for coercion
or was it peaceful persuasion? Mr. Justice Douglas did not know, and
854345 U.S. 192 (1953). This case shed no new light on the constitutional status
of picketing, since the Court had already accepted the unlawful objective formula
and had previously upheld state right-to-work laws. See Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co. and Whitaker v. North Carolina, 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
The Court had no difficulty in combining the two to prohibit picketing one of
the purposes of which was in violation of the right-to-work law. Interestingly,
Justice Black, who first clearly used the unlawful objective approach in Giboney
and who also wrote the opinion upholding state right-to-work laws, dissented.
He could do this without being inconsistent because the law involved did not
necessarily meet the criteria he outlined in his Giboney opinion.
85345 U.S. 192, 202 (1953).
S6Ibid.
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it appears most unlikely that any court in the country could determine
the question. Although intent may be vitally important in many
phases of law, it is certainly inappropriate and largely irrelevant
as a constitutional criterion for picketing cases.
The weakness of the signal-publicity test is not merely that it is
unworkable in practice - it is as fallacious in theory as the economic
nexus of Mr. Justice Frankfurter. It assumes, quite wrongly, that a
signal and publicity are the two largely exclusive halves of picketing.
A moment's reflection will show that, while not all signals may aim
at publicity, it is hard to conceive of successful publicity that cannot
also be taken, quite spontaneously perhaps, as a signal for economic
coercion. The signal aspect is not so much a part of the communication as it is a matter of subjective interpretation. Thus the same picketing may be publicity to an interested onlooker but a quite definite
signal to a union member who would be subject to a fine equal to a
year's wages if he were to cross the picket line. Since the Court has
already held that when any one of the purposes of picketing is to
87
foster an unlawful objective picketing may be enjoined in toto,
the signal-publicity criterion appears to have been stillborn. This
is scarcely to be lamented, inasmuch as all picketing contains at least
potential elements of both signal and publicity. And, since "result"
is one of the most frequently accepted indications of "intent," the
probable effect of attempting to use this test would be to enjoin
picketing whenever it appeared effective and allow it when it did
not matter.
Picketing, as indicated time and again, is more than economic
coercion but also more than pure speech. Since the attempts to divide
picketing into its pure speech and more-than-speech instances appear
to be fruitless, the better solution lies in the "limited right" approach
along some such lines as those suggested by Mr. Justice Black in his
Giboney opinion.s s At present, however, Mr. Justice Black is fols71nternational Brotherhood of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
SThat this opinion uses the unlawful objective approach should not blind
one to the all-important fact that he carefully qualified what was to be regarded
as serious enough to warrant enjoining all picketing in a dispute. It is the
qualifications, not the empty verbal formula, that matter. Even the "clear and
present danger" test is, in essence, also a qualified test of "unlawful objective."
The limitation is that there must be a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil within the power of government before speech may be classified as unlawful.
In comparison to this Justice Black's four-part test seems at least equally useful

as a judicial instrument, but its lack of rhetorical appeal appears to have proved
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lowing a lonely path in dissent or separate concurrence in most
picketing cases. Mr. Justice Douglas appears to be permanently frustrated by the lack of psychoanalytic evidence of purpose in picketing.
Meanwhile the majority of the Court is deciding cases on a gross
perversion of Mr. Justice Black's suggested test: picketing for any
and all unlawful objectives may be enjoined. The unlawful objective formula certainly has the merit of simplicity, and in one form
or another it has been accepted by every member of the present Court
who has had occasion to pass on it,"" but as a constitutional standard
does it have anything other than simplicity to recommend it? If not,
are we to abandon the concept of constitutional limitation merely
because it becomes difficult to define a limit?
Again a little logical analysis is instructive. Peaceful picketing
was, under Thornhill, presumed to be protected as free speech, and
the only limitation on speech is clear and present danger of a substantive evil. But now picketing for any objective declared by Congress,
state legislatures, or the courts to be contrary to public policy may
be enjoined. And what is the limit on objectives that can be declared
unlawful? Constitutionally, and the distinction later becomes of the
first importance, the only limit under present economic due process
is that the Court can find some sort of reasonable basis for the law.
"Unlawful objective" is thus not itself a constitutional standard and
bears absolutely no relation to the First Amendment; rather, it is
a mere verbal formula.0 0 Its acceptance makes a "reasonable basis"
the only constitutional restraint.91 At this point the discussion switches
ground from civil liberties, the First Amendment, the "preferred
position" doctrine, and effective judicial review into the field of
economic and social policy, procedural due process, and judicial
respect for any policy of a legislative majority so long as the policy
does not lack a reasonable basis or upset the federal system. Thus
fatal.
8OSee appendix for a comparison of the varying degrees of acceptance.
0rThe concept of something being an unlawful objective was implicit in
Frankfurter's economic nexus doctrine, in which conscripting neutrals beyond the
industry involved would be unlawful, and in Cox's signal-publicity test, in which
picketing as a signal would be unlawful. Used without any qualification, however, the "unlawful objective" rubric is a mere verbal formula that ignores all
the speech aspects in picketing and relegates it, under the Court's post-1937
economic "due process," to regulation on any sort of reasonable basis.
O1Thus either the speech element in picketing or the existence of the First
Amendment is ignored in favor of a Hobbesian acceptance as "good law" of
whatever a state legislature or the Congress passes.
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either picketing is speech and should be protected to the full extent
of the clear and present danger test, or it must be relegated to regulation on a reasonable basis like any ordinary phase of economic life.
To an absolutist there is no middle way out of the dilemma. But
such "label thinking" in terms of absolutistic standards and fixed
categories is incompatible with the Supreme Court's balancing-process function and ignores the hybrid nature of most picketing. It also
may be criticized on one more very practical level.
As has been emphasized by one recent commentator, civil liberties
cases involve both the judges' libertarian sympathies and their conception of the role of the judiciary. 92 At present it might be pointed
out, before criticizing any retreat from Thornhil, that a strict enforcement of the picketing-free speech dogma would render unenforceable or unconstitutional a significant part of the Taft-Hartley
Act and of numerous state laws on the right to work, on trade restraints such as involved in the Giboney case, and on other aspects of
labor relations. Further, the virtual abdication of control of social
and economic policy to legislative majorities in the period since 1937
has placed the Court in a strangely ambivalent position as it seeks
to assert decisive judicial control in the field of civil liberties. Aside
from the all too obvious fact that this development of the law of
civil liberty has come at the very time when public sentiment, as
reflected in the actions of the Chief Executive, the Congress, and
state legislatures, is narrowing the field, the effect of the Court's extreme self-restraint in reviewing social and economic legislation is
to cast popular doubt upon the validity of its claim to review any acts
of legislation, including those touching upon civil liberties. As yet
the Court has failed to work out a satisfactory rationale as to why
the justices should defer to the majority desire for social and economic
legislation but resist the majority desire for legislation curbing activities thought by the members of the- Court to be within the domain
of civil liberties. 93
Although reasonable judicial restraint is certainly to be desired
in a democratic society, the very foundation of constitutional government requires that there be some enforceable limits on power. 94 The
92Pritchett, Libertarian Motivation on the Vinson Court, 47 AmER. PoL.
SciENcE REv. 321 (1953).
93The dilemma of the Court has been analyzed by Latham, Supreme Court and
Supreme People, 16 J. PoLrrIcs 207 (1954).

94The reluctance of the Court to enforce such limits in the areas of control of
the mails, the rights of public employees, and the status of aliens and naturalized
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extent of judicial abdication proclaimed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
and, for the purpose of allowing free reign in enjoining picketing for
any unlawful objective, accepted by a majority of the Court, seems
excessive. That the Court has lowered the standard to accept any
reasonable legislative declaration of an unlawful objective is bad
enough, but when it is considered that judicial statements of policy
and ad hoc court determinations of the best interests of the community
have also been accepted as establishing unlawful objectives the situation is indeed not encouraging. 95
Still, our legal Cinderella is considerably better off today than
before Thornhill. It is now firmly established that a blanket prior
restraint of all picketing is unconstitutional; and, more important,
the whole burden of proof has been shifted from the picketers to
those claiming to be unlawfully hurt. As with the presumption of
innocence, this is no small difference. To demand further that every
legislative regulation of picketing be regarded as presumptively unconstitutional,9" as the only alternative to government by injunction,
is to create a false dilemma that ignores the middle ground, foreshadowed in the brief period from Senn to Thornhill, in which
picketing in labor disputes is established and limited by statute. But
should not the Court retain some check on the extent to which picketing can be regulated?
If picketing is more than speech then it is only right that our
legal Cinderella cannot claim the tiny glass slipper of "clear and
present danger" that is designed for speech only. Although Cinderella's foot is too large for that slipper, the author - and, by analogy,
Mr. Justice Black - would not relegate her to any "reasonable" sort
of footwear that may be presented, but would seek to tailor some sort
of less glamorous First Amendment protection of a hybrid sort.
ACT III: THAT OLD BLACK MAGIC-

THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT AS

PRINCE CHARMING?

The most recent developments in the Court's treatment of picketing
citizens has been discussed in terms that are generally also applicable to peaceful
picketing in McCloskey, The McCarran Act and the Doctrine of Arbitrary Power,
4 PUBLIC POLICY 228 (Harvard Univ. Grad. School of Pub. Adm'n 1953).

D5These are the results of the Hughes and Hanke cases, respectively. Such
determinations do not come "encased in the armor wrought by prior legislative
determination," Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 261 (1941).

96See the famous note 4 to United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144,

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol7/iss2/2

24

Price: Picketing--A Legal Cinderella
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
have not been in relation to the First Amendment, but their crucial
influence on the future status of peaceful picketing and on the
use of the "unlawful objective" formula make them worthy of close
attention. The predictions of the prophets of doom that acceptance
of an unqualified unlawful objective rule by a majority of the Court
spelled a return to government by injunction have not been fulfilled.
The so-called Northwest Passage around Thornhill has not led back
to the old pre-1937 world but into a New World in which the legal
battles over picketing are neither constitutional nor common law
but rather turn on statute law. And here again another article appearing over a decade ago and relating the status of picketing to the
struggle between federal and state jurisdictions hinted at the turn
of the most recent developments.9
Paradoxically, the statutory Prince Charming currently claimed
by our legal Cinderella, union picketing, turns out to be none
other than the Taft-Hartley Act 98 And let there be no mistake - this
role is now clearly recognized by both sides, as evidenced by the
following conclusion to an article written by the ultra-conservative,
pro-business columnist, Henry Hazlitt: "Peaceable and balanced
labor relations are most likely to come through the repeal or drastic
revision of the Taft-Hartley Act and local enforcement of the common law against coercion, intimidation, and violence." 99 Here is a
conservative Republican, who believes in the gold standard and a
return to government by injunction, strongly denouncing the TaftHartley Act, which was passed by the conservative, Republican-controlled 80th Congress. Why this sudden reversal of positions?
Briefly, the Taft-Hartley Act was passed as a comprehensive
statute to govern labor-management relations coming within the vast
152 (1938).
97Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 H~Av. L. Rav. 180, 218 (1942): "The
rivalry over jurisdiction between the state and federal courts is as old as the
Constitution. It is in relation to this controversy, and not in reference to its
identification with free speech, that the present constitutional status of picketing
should be determined." While Teller was quite right about the ultimately crucial
importance of federalism, he was largely concerned with the maintenance of state
court control through the common law rather than with the problem of conflicting federal and state statute law in the labor relations field; see note 120 infra.
9sTechnically, of course, this is the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,
61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §141 (1952), amending the 1935 National
Labor Relations-Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. 151 (1946), popularly known
as the Wagner Act.
99Hazlitt, The Ethics of Picketing, Newsweek, Dec. 28, 1953, p. 59.
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scope of the commerce power. 100 The act outlines both rights and
duties, and one of the federal rights guaranteed labor is to engage in
concerted activities so long as they do not constitute unfair labor
practices as determined by the National Labor Relations Board.101
Such comprehensive federal legislation inevitably raised the question
as to whether it did not pre-empt the field within the scope of the
commerce power so that states could neither add to nor subtract
from the rights and duties therein provided. Most legal commentators
believed that such must be the result,102 and several state courts ruled
that the state was powerless to exercise jurisdiction over picketing in
interstate commerce except in the case of violence or mass picketing,
03
when use of the state police power has been the traditional remedy.2
In 1952 a test case, argued on the issue of pre-emption, reached the
Supreme Court but was dismissed on the ground that the writ of
04
certiorari had been improvidently granted.
lOORecently extended to purely intrastate commerce in the utility field by
Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 383 (1951), 5 U. OF FLA. L. Rxv. 205
(1952).
20'For discussions of the act see Cox, Federalismin Labor Law, 67 HA~v. L. REV.
1297 (1954), Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARv.
L. REv. 1 (1947); Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARv.
L. REv. 211 (1950); Hall, The Taft-Hartley Act v. State Regulation, 1 J. PUB. L. 97
(1952); Handler, The Impact of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
Upon the Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Union Activities, 26 TEmiP. L.Q. 111
(1952). Between the categories of unfair practices and protected activities there
has been a "twilight zone"; see International Union v. Wisconsin Empl. Rel. Bd., 336
U.S. 245 (1949) ("quickies"); NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939)
(strike in breach of contract); Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950) (slowdown);
cf. Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E.2d 697 (1951) (organizational
picketing).
102This was the view of Emil Schlesinger, A Summary and Critique of the
Law of Peaceful Picketing in New York, 22 FoRD. L. REv. 20, 73 (1953): "Yet, if
the logic of its past opinions is to flower, if the patterns established by Congress
are to have meaning, the Court must ultimately hold that Congress has preempted the entire field of purposes and objectives in labor-management relations,
which affect interstate commerce, and that it has entrusted the administration of
this field to the NLRB and its enforcement to the federal courts." In substantial
agreement with this view are Cox and Seidman, supra note 101.
03This exception has firm precedent in Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Empi.
Rel. Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942), and Cole v. Arkansas, 338 U.S. 345 (1949).
lo4Montgomery Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 344
U.S. 178 (1952). The case involved a state court injunction against peaceful
picketing which the union claimed was within the federally pre-empted area of
labor relations. In relation to peaceful strikes for higher wages the Court had
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On December 14, 1953, however, Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for
a unanimous Court, announced a decision in Garner v. Teamsters,
Chauffers and Helpers Local 776,05 a case involving picketing which
was within the scope of the Taft-Hartley Act and also prohibited by
action of the state. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held
that the federal "provisions for a comprehensive remedy precluded
any State action by way of a different or additional remedy for the
correction of the identical grievance." 10 6 Against this view it had been
argued that the Taft-Hartley Act protected public rights for the public
interest, but that it was up to the states to provide additional legislation to protect private rights in labor disputes. 10 7 The Court's
answer was unequivocal: 108
"We conclude that when federal power constitutionally
is exerted for the protection of public or private interests, or
both, it becomes the supreme law of the land and cannot be
curtailed, circumvented or extended by a state procedure
merely because it will apply some doctrine of private right.
To the extent that the private right may conflict with the public
one, the former is superseded. To the extent that public
interest is found to require official enforcement instead of
private initiative, the latter will ordinarily be excluded."
So long as a comprehensive labor-management relations act remains
already upheld the exclusiveness of federal power in International Union of
United Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950). The key remaining
issue was whether federal intervention was so comprehensive as to pre-empt the
entire field and thus prevent the states from acting even on issues not specifically
covered in the Taft-Hartley Act.
10574 Sup. Ct. 161 (1953). Prior to this decision there had been considerable
confusion on the exclusiveness of federal jurisdiction. Compare, e.g., Pocahontas
Terminal Corp. v. Portland Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council, 93 F. Supp. 217 (D.
Me. 1950), with Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, supra note 101. See also Birnbaum,
Jurisdiction of State Courts to Enjoin Illegal Picketing of Employers Engaged
in Interstate Commerce, 3 SYRACUSE L. Rlv. 376 (1952); Handier, supra note 101.
lo6Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local 776, 373 Pa. 19, 28, 94 A.2d
893, 898 (1953).
1OIThis dichotomy was confidently argued by Rose, The Labor-Management
Relations Act and the State's Power to Grant Relief, 39 VA. L. lEv. 765 (1953).
For Rose's critical view of the decision see Garner v. Teamsters: The Supreme
Court and Private Rights, 40 VA. L. REv. 177 (1954). Whether the pen will
prove mightier than the bench remains to be seen.
loSGarner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local 776, 74 Sup. Ct. 161, 171
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in force nationally and concurrent state jurisdiction is denied, it
appears that the ultimate extent to which the constitutional protection of picketing as speech might be shrunk has become largely a
moot question:' 09
"The detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of
specified types of picketing would seem to imply that other
picketing is to be free of other methods and sources of restraints.
For the policy of the national Labor Management Relations
Act [Taft-Hartley Act] is not to condemn all picketing but only
that ascertained by its prescribed processes to fall within its prohibitions. Otherwise, it is implicit in the Act that the public
interest is served by freedom of labor to use the weapon of
picketing. For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat
designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal
policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes
or by methods which the federal Act prohibits."
The above case, and a decision handed down the same day holding
an automobile dealer within the power of the commerce clause and
hence subject to the Taft-Hartley Act, 1 0 were the cause of Mr.
Hazlitt's outburst against the Taft-Hartley Act.-" But when the Court
indicates that all picketing is not proscribed - not because it is
constitutionally protected to some degree but solely because it is
not the policy of Congress to completely condemn "the weapon of
picketing" - it only confirms the view that, as one commentator put
(1953).
1091d. at 170.
ilOHowell Chevrolet Co. v. NLRB, 74 Sup. Ct. 214 (1953).
"'lActually the Garner decision follows the line of reasoning of Hill v. Florida,
325 U.S. 538 (1945), which held Wagner Act provisions originally aimed at antiunion practices of employers to also preclude state legislation inconsistent with
the guaranties of the act, and of International Union v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454
(1950). The unfortunate over-extension of exclusive NLRB jurisdiction into
truly local labor problems results mainly from two factors. First, the Wagner Act
was framed to utilize all of the Federal Government's then (1935) rather narrowly
limited power in the field, but with the constitutional revolution of 1937 this

power was tremendously expanded. Second, the Taft-Hartley Act failed to provide that national action should be restricted to a scope short of the greatly
extended post-1937 limits on national power in the labor field. Obviously the
Federal Government need not act to the full extent of its permissible power,
nor need it reduce the role of the states to an absolute minimum.
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it: "There can be but one conclusion drawn from an analysis of
the recent cases: The Thornhill doctrine exists only as a historical
footnote.""12
The only other picketing cases decided during the 1953 term of
the Court give no indication of any trend back to the attempt to spell
out the limits of picketing regulation by means of constitutional interpretation."31 Comprehensive congressional regulation and federal
pre-emption of most of the labor-management relations field, including such concerted activities as peaceful picketing, indicate that
the future status of picketing will not be determined largely through
government by injunction under the common law rules of tort, or
by anti-labor state legislatures wielding an unqualified power to set
unlawful objectives, or by nine justices meditating in Washington
on the meaning of the First Amendment. The future limits on
peaceful picketing in labor disputes apparently will be largely worked
out between the President and the elected representatives of the
Congress. The constitutional basis from which they will work may
be roughly summarized as follows.
(1) A total ban by prior restraint of all picketing cannot be
justified by any criteria used by the Court since Thornhill and would
presumably still be held unconstitutional as violative of the First
Amendment.
(2) Picketing by unorganized groups for noneconomic purposes
has never been before the Supreme Court since the picketing-free
speech doctrine was announced in 1940. In many situations, such as
political campaigns, its ordinary use could hardly be prohibited by
any conceivable stretching of the unlawful objective formula. Since
picketing per se cannot be made unlawful, it would seem likely that
ll2Burstein, Picketing and Speech, 4 LABOR L.J. 791, 803 (1953).
"S3NLRB v. Local Union 1229, 74 Sup. Ct. 172 (1953), is interesting as a
reflection on the argument that the factual content of picketing is too small to
warrant protection. Striking technical employees of a Charlotte TV station substituted for the usual picketing signs material attacking the low quality of the
station's programs and asking if Charlotte was a "Second Class City." Although
Frankfurter, Black, and Douglas, JJ., held that this was "concerted activity" and
not just cause for dismissal, the majority, including Chief Justice Warren, upheld
the firing of employees on the ground that criticism not directly related to the
labor dispute was disloyalty and hence sufficient cause for dismissal. Since the
case concerned only job rights, rather than an injunction or punishment, the
constitutional issue of free speech was not involved, except for the implied necessity
of a "content nexus" as well as of an "economic nexus." Capital Service, Inc. v.
NLRB, 74 Sup. Ct. 699 (1954), further implemented the Garner trend.
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picketing for purposes not within the scope of economic coercion
might still claim constitutional protection under the First Amendment.
(3) Picketing by labor unions in economic disputes is more than
just speech and is subject to regulation beyond that applied to
ordinary speech.
(a) Congress may regulate the methods and purposes of picketing
in labor-management disputes falling within the scope of the
commerce power. Unfair labor practices as determined by
the National Labor Relations Board acting pursuant to the
Taft-Hartley Act constitute unlawful objectives, for which
picketing may be enjoined by the federal courts. Otherwise,
workers may picket as a federally protected right to concerted
activity under the act. The states can neither add to nor subtract from the list of unfair labor practices or the extent of
the right to concerted activity, except for traditional use of
the police power.
(b) The states may regulate the method of picketing in respect
to numbers, quietness, truthful placards, open ingress and
egress, suitable hours, absence of violence, and other ap14
propriate regulations under the police power.
(c) The states may regulate the objectives for which picketing may
be carried on in the areas reserved to them under the TaftHartley Act and in the dwindling area of intrastate commerce
not touched by the commerce power.llu At present a state's
determination of an unlawful objective may be made by the
legislature on any reasonable basis with or without a criminal sanction, or may be based on judicial policy, or may be
arrived at by the state court's interpretation of the best interests of the community. The last-mentioned extension, how1Z4A borderline exception to this is Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin, 340 U.S.
383 (1951), denying power of a state to apply compulsory arbitration to labor
disputes of public utilities in which picketing or a strike would endanger the
health or safety of the community.
lisFederal regulation has been so over-extended into areas of local labor
relations that the evils of concurrent regulation can only be avoided by a substantial contraction of the scope of NLRB jurisdiction, or the advantages of
federalism will be largely lost in the labor relations area. For examples of extension into local industries see Howell Chevrolet Co. v. NLRB, 346 U.S. 482
(1953) (automobile agencies); NLR1B v. Stoller, 207 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 517 (1954) (laundries); NLRB v. American Bottling Co., 205
F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 921 (1954) (bottling companies).
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ever, received the unqualified approval of only four justices,
including the late Chief Justice Vinson.
EPILOGUE

The picketing-free speech doctrine which rose so rapidly into
prominence in the American constitutional scene with the Thornhill
decision now appears to have been generally overruled sub silentio.
Whether the magic wand of "free speech" will ever again be applied
to union picketing is questionable. More likely, the picketing-free
speech cases will serve as a reminder that various activities involving
the communication of ideas but not specifically equal to ordinary
speech may raise First Amendment questions.116 When such questions
are not raised in some dear manner, as by the comprehensive prior
restraint in the Thornhill case or by restraint of picketing for political
rather than economic objectives, it now appears that the Supreme
Court will leave to the political branches of government, especially
to those of the national government, the responsibility of setting the
limits on acceptable picketing.
By treating picketing as a statutory right guaranteed under certain
conditions by the Taft-Hartley Act rather than as a constitutional right
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the majority of
the present Court has neatly evaded the difficult problem of working
out appropriate criteria for a "limited right."
From the viewpoint of those who regard picketing as primarily
speech, our Cinderella is headed back to the scullery; conversely, for
those who look at picketing as an obvious form of economic coercion
she is on her way back to the ball.11 7 Since picketing is an integral
part of the controversial labor-management relations field, which is
supercharged with emotion as well as characterized by deep-seated
differences of political belief based on widely divergent social philosot6In the future the Court would do well to beware of the use of labels and
blanket identifications. If the Thornhill case included within the area of protected speech too much, too categorically, it would appear that other cases such as
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940), may have excluded too much, too categorically. Without becoming
completely eclectic, there is something to be said for Justice Frankfurter's famous
distrust of generalities in the application of constitutional concepts.
l17For a spirited discussion of picketing as coercion see Jones, Picketing and
Coercion: A Jurisprudence of Epithets; Gregory, A Defense; Jones, A Reply; Gregory, A Conclusion, 39 VA. L. REv. 1023-1069 (1953).
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phies, such a difference in viewpoint is probably inevitable. At
present the advantage, both in terms of decisions and of semantics,
lies with those who regard picketing as coercion."I8
For economic conservatives it is frustrating for the Court to
virtually admit, on the one hand, that even peaceful picketing is not
constitutionally protected and yet, on the other hand, largely take
away under the commerce power the right to regulate picketing
except by act of Congress and subsequent enforcement through the
federal courts. But neither do liberals and civil-liberties enthusiasts
have anything to exult over-any federal statute is likely to prove
a rather inconstant Prince Charming. Should the provisions of the
Taft-Hartley Act guaranteeing the right to participate in concerted
activity be repealed, or modified- 9 so as to permit concurrent state
regulation, the power of the Court to strike down any sort of unnecessarily restrictive policy favored by state legislative or congressional majorities will be weakened. It might be concluded from a
politico-psychological interpretation of the Court's shifts in attitude
in regard to picketing that in recognition of existing political realities
it is over-zealously pushing federal pre-emption of the labor-management relations field throughout the vast area of the commerce power
as a sort of compensation mechanism for having failed to meet the
First Amendment questions raised by peaceful picketing in a context of economic dispute.12
18The hybrid nature of picketing-part speech and part economic coerdonmakes the assertion of judicial checks on legislative restraints even more difficult
than in the case of pure civil liberties issues. Once the unlawful objective shibboleth is used the Court is on the defensive and the issue is framed largely in
terms of legislative regulation of economic action, which the Court is prone since
1937 to uphold, rather than in terms of restraint of speech, which the Court has
regarded with more suspidon.
1lOThus far all attempts at amendment of the Taft-Hartley Act this year have
been defeated. Although President Eisenhower's proposals involved features
favored by both labor and management, neither side was satisfied. On the key
issue of allowing greater autonomy for state action the proposals faced an unusual
opposition coalition of Southern states' rights advocates, who regarded the Republican plan as not going nearly far enough, and Northern liberal Democrats,
who opposed it as going much too far. See especially the Smith bill, limiting
NLRB jurisdiction, S. 1785, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), and the Goldwater Bill,
ceding the states power to regulate strikes and picketing in industries affecting interstate commerce, S. 1161, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
120Such
an interpretation presumes only the obvious: that the Court recognizes
that both labor and management command considerable political power, but that
their access to influence at different levels of government and through the various
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The sharp conflict over states' rights121 and certain other issues in
labor relations has obscured the vital fact that there is a large area
of common agreement in the labor-management field.122 The judgemade law of the era of government by injunction was grossly inadequate, and the political strength of organized labor makes discussion
of any attempt to return to it academic. On the other hand, the
public has reacted against unlimited economic warfare; and picketing,
since it may also involve economic sanctions and group discipline
1 2 -3
as well as ordinary speech, has come in for its share of regulation.
branches of government is strikingly different. Hence questions of procedure or
jurisdiction have great substantive importance in terms of result. At the national
level organized labor is ordinarily most influential through the Chief Executive,
since he is chosen by an electoral system which puts great emphasis on the
populous two-party states, where urban labor is strongest. Conversely, Congress
over-represents traditionally conservative rural elements and the small nonindustrial states, neither of which tend to be very favorable toward labor. On this basis
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act by Congress and its veto by President Truman
was to be expected. Although labor is at some disadvantage in Congress, it stands
a far better chance of attaining its ends there than in the state legislatures of
most states. The least favorable recourse for labor would be a return to injunctive
regulation by the state courts. Thus the Supreme Court's emphasis upon federal
pre-emption has come, like the Greek deus ex machina, to the aid of labor; and
Mr. Hazlitt's plea for a return to "local enforcement of the common law" is explicable in terms of the optimum goal of management.
121The sudden concern for states' rights by the very same political groups that
pushed federal intervention into the area of labor regulation, via the Taft-Hartley
Act, is not to be taken too seriously. Even the South, where the cry is somewhat
more hallowed than hollow, went to war in 1861 in part because of fear that
President Lincoln would respect states' rights in administering the Fugitive
Slave Law in the Northern states. For some classic examples of the inconsistency
of various groups on the issue of state v. federal action see Harris, States' Rights and
Vested Interests, 15 J. PoLrncs 457 (1953). This is, of course, a valid case for
limiting national intervention in the field so that the federal principle can be
maintained in the area of labor law. The case is well presented in Cox,
Federalism in Labor Law, 67 HARv. L. R~v. 1297

(1954). Professor Cox con-

cludes that NLRB jurisdiction has been extended too far and should be contracted
either by the Court or by statute, but that there is no sound reason for concurrent regulation of the same industries by both the states and the Federal Government.
222The conflicting viewpoints of the CIO, AFL, and NAM on the TaftHartley Act are presented in the symposium on The Law and Labor-Management
Relations, 23 TENN. L. REv. 112-176 (1954). Emphasis upon the areas of agreement
is stressed by Cox, Revision of the Taft-Hartley Act, 55 W. VA. L. Rxv. 91 (1953).
L2s1t is worth noting that in almost every case it is the action of non-picketing
union members or of the general public which actually constitutes the coercion.
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While industrial peace and quiet are worthy goals, economic freedom
-like political freedom -depends upon a certain degree of competition and conflict. The risks of strikes and picketing cannot be totally
eliminated without endangering collective bargaining, and collective
bargaining cannot be discarded without substituting an even greater
degree of government control. As George Bancroft put it a century
1 24
ago:
"The feud between the capitalist and laborer, the house of
Have and the house of Want, is as old as social union, and
can never be entirely quieted; but he who will act with moderation, prefer fact to theory, and remember that every thing
in this world is relative and not absolute, will see that the
violence of the contest may be stilled."
It is definitely in the public interest that violence and extreme
coercion in labor relations be stilled, but it is equally important that
the speech element in picketing be given due consideration. Excessive attempts by either labor or management to invoke government
intervention for its own economic advantage can only lead to a
"politicized" economy in which both would be subordinated to
bureaucracy, with freedom largely lost in the shuffle.
If the Congress and the state legislatures will act with moderation
in regard to the regulation of picketing the Court may not be forced
to again take up the thorny problem of definitively classifying the
"hybrid" of peaceful picketing. Should it be forced to do so it has
adequate precedents for protecting the public's right to information
Forbidding a single picket to march up and down with a sign is a handy way of
short-circuiting the most effective means of signaling a boycott or publicizing the
existence of a labor dispute. The same picket may be doing both simultaneously,
for, as Justice Holmes pointed out, dissenting in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 673 (1925), "Every idea is an incitement." If speech protection is not
to be considered at all in regulating pickets carrying signs, then what
of a sound truck broadcasting the facts of a labor dispute? What
of dissemination of the news by radio, by newspaper, or by pamphlet? What is
to prevent the extension of the use of the unlawful objective formula to prohibit any sort of communication by any effective means of information concerning labor disputes? It would be more in keeping with the American tradition to
seek to put some limits on the coercive action, e.g., forbid unions to fine members
for crossing a picket line, rather than to attempt to suppress every possible signal
or idea that can be taken as a signal.
124Quoted in A. M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON vii (1946).
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concerning labor disputes against Pickwickean regulations based on
quibbling use of the unlawful objective formula. 125 It is to be hoped
that, with the primary responsibility for regulating union picketing
now resting upon the Congress, the Court will brook no interference
with noneconomic picketing except in accord with free speech
criteria.126 There is also no inherent reason why the Court's abdication in favor of any unlawful objective established by state judicial
action or on the basis of a state court's ad hoc determination of the
best interests of the community need prove permanent. There is no
strong argument for the area of picketing regulation not being subject
to judicial review in the interest of the speech elements involved.
The field does not require highly technical knowledge of a specialized
nature; the processes of the Court are not unsuitable; the subject
matter certainly has not traditionally been insulated from judicial
control.
In retrospect it is hardly surprising that the Thornhill case did
not usher in the millenium in regard to disputes over picketing.
The "happily ever after" of the fairy tale apparently was not meant
for ordinary life, or for the development of constitutional law.

125The slippery phrase "unlawful objective" conceals an important distinction in that it covers not only (1) action to compel an employer to engage in unlawful conduct but also (2) bargaining demands which the employer could grant
without violating any statute or public policy but which the court happens to
regard as beyond the required scope of bargaining. For example, Professor Cox
has pointed out that in Massachusetts "a strike for a closed shop was unlawfuleven though a closed shop agreement was valid and enforceable in the same
courts," Federalism in Labor Law, 67 HAuv. L. Rav. 1297, 1327 (1954).
1261t is in this area that the Thornhill precedent may maintain some vitality.
If the Court is to permit legislative regulation of picketing within the scope
of labor-management relations the way should be cleared to apply either the clear
and present danger test or the criteria of a limited right to all noneconomic
picketing.
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APPENDIX
SUPREME COURT ACCEPTANCE OF "UNLAWFUL
OBJECTIVES" FOR PICKETING
JUSTICES
CASE, RATIONALE OF MAJORITY OPINION, AND
o
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PICKETING-FREE SPEECH
Thornhill: Clear and present
danger of a substantive evil
(Murphy)
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STATE REGULATION

Giboney: Integrated conducta clear danger of violating an
important public law
(Black)
Gazzam: Objective of violating
an important public law that
has no criminal sanction
(Minton)
Hughes: Objective of violating
established state judicial policy
(Frankfurter)
Hanke: Objective determined by
state court to be contrary to
best interest of community
(Frankfurter)
FEDERAL REGULATION
NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council: Signal picketing for unfair labor practice
under Taft-Hartley Act unlawful
(Burton)
International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers v. NLRB:
Publicity picketing for unfair
labor practice under Taft-Hartley Act unlawful
(Burton)
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EXCLUSIVENESS OF FEDERAL POWER

Garnerv. Teamsters, Chauffeurs
& Helpers: Federal regulation of
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excluding state action in area
designed to remain free
(Jackson)
*Also includes Chief Justice
Hughes and Justices Roberts
and Stone

KEY TO SYMBOLS
Participated in majority opinion
Concurs in decision
Dissents to opinion and decision
Absent from bench at time of decision
Not on the Court at the time
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